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viewed together, they strongly support the supposition that personal investment in unaided performance affects 
the likelihood of John Henry effects and intent errors. Application: These results demonstrate the need for a 
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Objective: This investigation examined the impact of human–machine competition 
(John Henry effects) on intent errors. John Henry effects, expressed as an unwilling- 
ness to use automation, were hypothesized to increase as a function of operators’ per- 
sonal investment in unaided performance. Background: Misuse and disuse often occur 
because operators (a) cannot determine if automation or a nonautomated alternative 
maximizes the likelihood of task success (appraisal errors) or (b) know the utilities of 
the options but disregard this information when deciding to use or not to use automation 
(intent errors). Although appraisal errors have been extensively studied, there is a paucity 
of information regarding the causes and prevention of intent errors. Methods: Operators 
were told how many errors they and an automated device made on a target detection task. 
Self-reliant operators (high personal investment) could depend on their performance or 
automation to identify a target. Other-reliant operators (low personal investment) could 
rely on another person or automation. Results: As predicted, self-reliance increased dis- 
use and decreased misuse. Conclusion: When the disuse and misuse data are viewed 
together, they strongly support the supposition that personal investment in unaided per- 
formance affects the likelihood of John Henry effects and intent errors. Application: 
These results demonstrate the need for a model of operator decision making that takes 
into account intent as well as appraisal errors. Potential applications include develop- 
ing interventions to counter the deleterious effects of human–machine competition and 
intent errors on automation usage decisions. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the home, the workplace, and on the battle- 
field, people often have the option of performing 
a task manually or relying on automation. These 
automation usage decisions (AUDs) are of great 
interest to system designers and operator train- 
ers because they influence the likelihood of task 
success. Inefficient AUDs often lower worker 
productivity and sometimes result in injury or 
death (e.g., Beck, Dzindolet & Pierce, 2002). 
Viewing automation usage from a decision- 
making perspective allows specification of 
two types of suboptimal choices.  Disuse  is 
the underutilization of technology, employing 
manual control or a low level of automation 
(LOA) when the task could be better performed 
with a higher LOA. Misuse is overreliance, or 
use of a high LOA when the task could be better 
accomplished manually or with a lower LOA 
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 
Beck et al. (2002) proposed that disuse and 
misuse frequently result from appraisal and 
intent errors. Appraisal errors are evaluation 
failures; they occur when the perceived utilities 
(Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, & Dawe, 2002) of the 
automated and nonautomated options fail to cor- 
respond with the actual utilities of the options. 
Unlike appraisal errors, intent errors are not 
caused by the inability of operators to assess the 
 
 
 
relative utilities of different LOAs. Operators 
committing intent errors know whether the 
automated or nonautomated alternative is most 
likely to produce a favorable task outcome. 
Nevertheless, they disregard these utilities and 
use a level of control that lowers the probability 
of task success. 
Why Distinguish Between Appraisal and 
Intent Errors 
Although it is well accepted that misjudg- 
ments of the utilities may produce disuse and 
misuse (DeVries & Midden, 2008; Dixon & 
Wickens, 2006; Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, Dawe, 
& Anderson, 2001; Kantowitz, Hanowski, & 
Kantowitz, 1997; Madhavan & Wiegmann, 
2007a; Madhavan, Wiegmann, & Lacson, 
2006; Parasuraman, Bahri, Deaton, Morrison, 
& Barnes, 1992; Parasuraman & Miller, 2004; 
Seppelt & Lee, 2007; Wiegmann, 2002), there 
is a paucity of information regarding the causes, 
incidence, and prevention of intent errors. This 
may be a particularly significant omission in 
the literature because many instances of dis- 
use and misuse could result from appraisal or 
intent errors. 
Reportedly, some soldiers in the first Gulf 
War turned off useful automated aids before 
going into battle (Dzindolet & Beck, 2006). 
These suboptimal AUDs could have been 
appraisal errors; soldiers may have underesti- 
mated the value of the aids. Or they could have 
been intent errors. Soldiers may have recog- 
nized the benefits of automation but employed 
manual control for other reasons. 
From an applied standpoint, intent errors need 
to be distinguished from appraisal errors because 
they frequently require different remedies. 
Education regarding the alternatives often pre- 
vents appraisal errors. For instance, pilots learn to 
rely on instruments rather than vision when 
they have difficulty determining the horizon. 
Education regarding the utilities is less likely 
to decrease intent errors. Amelioration of intent 
errors requires mitigating the impact of objectives 
that are incompatible with good performance. For 
example, craftsmen may initially oppose automa- 
tion they believe reduces them to “button push- 
ers” but become supporters of new technologies 
after status concerns are minimized. 
A recent study by Beck, Dzindolet, and 
Pierce (2007) demonstrated the need to con- 
trol intent as well as appraisal errors. In one 
condition, operators received feedback that an 
automated device was more accurate than their 
unaided target detection. Manipulation checks 
revealed that feedback eliminated or substan- 
tially reduced appraisal errors. Nevertheless, 
when choosing between automated and nonau- 
tomated control, operators relied on their own 
skills on 55% of the trials. 
In another condition, participants received 
scenario training plus feedback. Scenario train- 
ing, a technique designed to reduce intent errors, 
encouraged operators to compare unaided per- 
formance to the performance of an automated 
device. When used with informational feed- 
back, scenario training produced a statistically 
significant reduction in intent errors, decreasing 
the disuse rate from 55% to 29%. 
A key question left  unresolved  by  Beck 
et al.’s (2007) study is, What caused these 
intent errors? Why did the majority of opera- 
tors given feedback without scenario training 
refuse to use an aid they knew would increase 
the number of correct identifications? What 
motivated these operators to knowingly lower 
their performance? 
John Henry Effects, Personal Investment, 
and Automation Disuse and Misuse 
Many investigators (Bowers, Jentsch, Salas, 
& Braun, 1998; Miller & Parasuraman, 2007; 
Nass & Moon, 2000; Park & Catrambone, 
2007; Rajaonah, Tricot, & Anceaux, 2008) have 
proposed that operators establish “relation- 
ships” with their machines. Ideally, operators 
will form cooperative associations with their 
machine “partners” (Klein, Woods, Bradshaw, 
Hoffman, & Feltovich, 2004; Madhavan & 
Wiegmann, 2007b), much as they do with human 
teammates. 
Unfortunately, the history of technology 
(Binfield, 2004; Garson, 1995; Sheridan, 2002) 
is characterized by antagonistic as well as 
cooperative relationships between workers and 
automation. One explanation for the intent 
errors in Beck et al.’s (2007) study is that par- 
ticipants were unwilling to rely on automation 
because they saw the machine as a competitor or 
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threat. Responding to automation as a challenger, 
competitor, or adversary is called a John Henry 
effect after the legendary railroad man who died 
racing the steam drill (Nelson, 2006; Watson, 
1990). 
Informal observation suggests that human– 
machine competition is most likely to affect 
AUDs when workers highly value unaided 
performance. For instance, officers who have 
trained for years to maneuver soldiers on a battle 
space are likely to bristle at the suggestion that 
 
efficiently. The purpose of this experiment was 
to test the hypothesis that operators’ personal 
investment in unaided performance increases 
the likelihood of John Henry effects. 
Task, Design, and Hypotheses 
On each of a series of detection trials, opera- 
tors could rely on a human or machine to dis- 
tinguish “friendly” from “enemy” helicopters. 
Unlike some studies (e.g., Dzindolet et al. 2001; 
Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007a), the AUD was 
made before rather than after the target was 
shown. These kinds of decisions are common- 
place. For example, a commander could send 
a manned or an unmanned aerial vehicle on a 
reconnaissance mission. 
A 2 (operator:  self-reliant,  other-reliant)   
2 (machine reliability: inferior, superior) 14 
(trial blocks) mixed design was employed. 
Operator and trial blocks were within-subjects 
variables and machine reliability was a between- 
subjects variable. Self-reliant participants could 
depend on themselves or a combat identification 
device (CID) to identify the target. Those in the 
other-reliant condition could rely on a previous 
participant’s performance or the CID’s perfor- 
mance. Therefore, self-reliant but not other- 
reliant operators had the opportunity to become 
personally invested in unaided target detection. 
If the operator manipulation was effective, 
personal investment and human–machine 
competition should be greater in self- than in 
other-reliant conditions. 
The optimality of the AUD depended on the 
relative accuracies of the CID and human. In 
the superior machine condition, the CID made 
more correct identifications over the long run. 
Relying on human control was a suboptimal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesized relationships of personal 
investment and human–machine competition on disuse 
and misuse. 
 
 
AUD, an instance of disuse. If personal invest- 
ment enhances the operator’s preference for the 
nonautomated option, disuse should be greater 
among self- than among other-reliant operators. 
In the inferior machine condition, the human 
was more accurate than automation. Relying 
on  the  relatively  inaccurate  CID  constituted 
automation  misuse.  Because  they  are  more 
personally  invested  in  unaided  performance, 
self-reliant operators are predicted to exhibit 
stronger  preference  for  human  control  (less 
misuse) than other-reliant operators (Figure 1 
illustrates the hypotheses). 
The main effect for the trials variable is also 
predicted to be statistically significant. Some 
appraisal errors are expected on early trials 
before operators have sufficient opportunity to 
compare human with machine accuracy. Across 
trials, cumulative feedback should decrease 
appraisal errors, producing a statistically sig- 
nificant reduction in suboptimal AUDs. 
The LOA that the operator relies on is one 
of many variables that influence the likeli- 
hood of a correct identification. Therefore, an 
inverse but imperfect correlation is expected 
between suboptimal AUDs and performance. 
Experimental manipulations that increase sub- 
optimal AUDs are predicted to produce lower 
levels of performance. 
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Participants 
METHOD Each trial began with a “Credit Choice” 
screen on which participants elected to base 
the upcoming trial on nonautomated or auto- 
Serving as participants were 88 undergradu- 
ates (44 females and 44 males) enrolled at a 
comprehensive southeastern university served as 
participants. Random assignment was employed 
with the stipulations that each cell contained the 
same number of participants and an equal num- 
ber of each gender. Procedures were approved 
by an institutional review board and were in 
accord with the guidelines for ethical conduct 
(American Psychological Association, 2001). 
Instrumentation 
The workstation was an Intel Pentium III, 
864-MHz central processing unit equipped with 
256 MB of random-access memory, a mouse, 
and keyboard. Slides were shown on a 38.1-cm 
V755 OptiQuest View Sonic Monitor driven 
by a Dell Dimension XPS B866 video card. 
Resolution was high color (16-bit), 1,024 768 
pixels. A Visual Basic program presented the 
slides and recorded responses. 
The targets were black-and-white photo- 
graphs of 72 Black Hawk (friendly) and 72 Hind 
(enemy) helicopters. Some pictures were of 
complete helicopters, and others showed part of 
a helicopter. Of the slides, 136 were presented 
twice and 8 pictures once, yielding a total of 280 
trials. 
 
Procedure 
Self-reliant operators. Participants were 
instructed that the task involved distinguishing 
friendly from enemy helicopters. On each trial, 
operators could rely on themselves or the CID to 
identify the target. Photographs of the two types 
of helicopters were placed on the workstation to 
assist the operators during the detection trials. 
The participants’ goal was to earn as many 
credit points as possible. Operators gained one 
credit point if they based credit on their perfor- 
mance and their targeting decision was correct 
or if they based credit on the machine’s answer 
and it was right. They earned zero credit points 
if they based credit on themselves and their tar- 
geting decision was wrong or if they relied on 
the CID and it was incorrect. Operators received 
$5 at the end of the session if their total credit 
points exceeded the 50th percentile. 
mated control (Figure 2). Choices were indi- 
cated by clicking a button labeled “Credit 
Point For The Next Trial Will Be Based On My 
Response” or “Credit Point For The Next Trial 
Will Be Based On The Combat Identification 
Device’s Response.” This AUD yielded the 
main dependent measure. 
Next, a target photograph was displayed for 
0.75 s. Then, the “Operator Response” screen 
appeared. Participants clicked the “Fire” button 
or “Hold Fire” button, depending on whether they 
believed the photo was a friend or enemy. Operators 
attempted to identify the target, regardless of their 
decision on the Credit Choice screen. 
The “Combat Identification Device 
Response” screen then emerged and indicated if 
the CID would fire or hold fire. Each trial con- 
cluded with the “Results” screen. It revealed 
(a) the operator’s choice on the Credit Choice 
screen, (b) the operator’s and CIDs’ targeting 
decisions, (c) whether a friend or enemy was 
in the slide, and (d) if the operator received a 
credit point for that trial. 
Counters located at the center of the Credit 
Choice screen provided running totals  of 
errors made by the participant on the Operator 
Response screen and errors made by the 
machine on the CID Response screen. After 
operators learned whether the human was more 
or less accurate than the CID, any suboptimal 
AUDs were expected to result from intent rather 
than appraisal errors. 
Unbeknownst to the operators, the CID’s 
accuracy depended on their performance and 
the level of the machine reliability. For exam- 
ple, if an operator paired with the superior 
machine made 40 errors during the session, the 
CID made approximately 20 mistakes. If a par- 
ticipant working with the inferior machine made 
15 errors, the CID made roughly 30 mistakes. 
After four sample trials, operators were 
questioned to ensure that they understood the 
directions. The experimenter then left the room 
and the detection trials began. 
Other-reliant operators. Like self-reliant 
operators, the goal of other-reliant operators 
was to earn as many credit points as possible. 
Participants assigned to the other-reliant con- 
ditions were treated identically to those in the 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Sequence of screens composing a detection trial: Credit Choice screen (a), photograph of a friendly (b) 
or enemy helicopter (c), Operator Response screen (d), Combat Identification Device Response screen (e), and 
Results screen (f). 
 
max 
max 
 
self-reliant conditions with these exceptions. 
On the Credit Choice screen, other-reliant stu- 
dents clicked a button labeled “Credit Point For 
The Next Trial Will Be Based On A Previous 
Operator’s Response,” or they pressed a but- 
ton labeled “Credit Point For The Next Trial 
Will Be Based On The Combat Identification 
Device’s Response.” 
The target slide was then shown, followed 
by the Operator Response screen. Other-reliant 
participants, however, did not attempt to distin- 
guish friendly from enemy helicopters. Instead, 
they viewed a self-reliant operator’s choice to fire 
or hold fire. Each trial concluded with the CID 
Response and Results screens. Total mistakes 
made by a prior participant on the Operator 
Response screen and by the machine on the 
CID Response screen were displayed by error 
immediate feedback were employed. There 
should be little difference in how self- and 
other- reliant operators rated the relative 
accuracy of the CID. 
The investigator returned to the room 
following the manipulation checks. Operators 
received $5 if they obtained more than 210 
credit points; otherwise, no money was 
given. Participants were thanked and 
debriefed. 
RESULTS 
The dependent variables were the frequency 
of suboptimal AUDs and the frequency of trials 
in which the operator received no credit point 
(NCP). The error variances associated with the 
superior machine condition were much greater 
than the error variances associated with the 
inferior  machine  condition.  With  suboptimal 
counters on the Credit Choice screen. AUDs as the dependent measure, F (2, 21) = 
Operators assigned to the other-reliant groups 3.83, p < .01, with NCPs as the dependent vari- 
were yoked to an individual in the self-reliant able, F (2, 21) = 3.21, p < .05. Therefore, the 
groups with respect to the gender of the partici 
pant and the machine reliability variable. For 
instance, assume a woman in the self-reliant 
condition worked with the superior machine, 
clicked “Fire” on Trial 32, and saw that the 
CID held fire. Then, a woman in the other 
reliant condition who worked with the superior 
machine saw that the previous participant fired 
on Trial 32 and that the CID held fire. 
Manipulation checks. Participants responded 
to two five-item Likert-type items following 
the 280th trial. The first question, “Which was 
more important to you: earning credit points 
or answering (seeing a previous participant 
answered) correctly on the Operator Response 
screen?” assessed the operator variable. If 
self-reliance enhanced  personal  investment in 
unaided performance and human–machine 
competition, correct answers on the Operator 
Response screen should be more important to 
self than to other reliant participants. 
The second item, “Do you think that you 
(the previous participant) or the combat iden 
tification device was more accurate in distin 
guishing friendly from enemy helicopters?” 
tested the machine reliability variable. If the 
manipulation was successful, operators in the 
superior conditions should rate the CID as more 
accurate than operators assigned to the inferior 
conditions. Furthermore, because yoking and 
levels of machine reliability were examined 
separately. 
Two 2 (operator: self reliant, other reliant)  
14 (trial blocks) repeated measures ANOVAs 
were performed on the data of participants 
assigned to the superior machine condition, 
one for each dependent measure. Two similar 
ANOVAs were conducted on the responses of 
operators paired with an inferior machine. 
Superior Machine Conditions 
The main effect for the operator variable was 
statistically significant with suboptimal AUDs 
as the dependent variable, F(1, 21) = 38.54, p < 
.001, partial eta squared = .65. If the machine’s 
accuracy was superior to the human, self-reliant 
operators made more suboptimal decisions 
(M = 177.32) than other-reliant (M = 64.82) 
operators (Figure 3). A statistically significant 
main effect for the trial blocks variable was also 
obtained, F(13, 273) = 3.02, p < .001, partial 
eta squared = .13. Fewer suboptimal AUDs 
occurred on the later trial blocks. The Operator  
Trial Blocks interaction was not statistically 
significant, F(13, 273) = 1.58, ns, partial eta 
squared = .07. 
A significant main effect for the operator 
variable was also found if NCP was the depen 
dent measure, F(1, 21) = 15.44, p < .001, par 
tial eta squared = .42. Self-reliant operators 
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Figure 3. Mean suboptimal automation usage deci 
sions as a function of the operator variable and trial 
blocks for participants working with the superior 
machine. 
 
 
(M = 54.18) had more NCPs than other-reliant 
operators (M = 43.86). Trial blocks was also 
statistically significant, F(1, 21) = 5.80, p < 
.001, partial eta squared = .22. NCPs declined 
across trials. The two-way interaction was not 
statistically significant, F(13, 273) = 1.58, ns, 
partial eta squared = .07. 
Inferior Machine Conditions 
ANOVA yielded a statistically significant 
main effect for the operator variable with sub- 
optimal choices as the dependent variable, 
F(1, 21) = 9.62, p < .01, partial eta squared = .31. 
In the inferior machine condition, self-reliant 
operators committed more suboptimal  AUDs 
(M = 40.09) than other-reliant (M = 11.36) 
operators (Figure 4). The trial blocks variable also 
attained statistical 
significance,F(13,273)=16.45, p < .001, partial 
eta squared = .44. Suboptimal AUDs were 
more frequent on early trial blocks. A 
statistically significant ordinal interaction was 
also found, F (13, 273) = 8.51, p < .001, partial 
eta squared = .29. Other-reliant operators exhib 
ited a greater decline in suboptimal AUDs across 
trials than self-reliant operators. 
Analysis of the NCPs of participants paired 
with an inferior machine yielded a statistically 
significant main effect for the operator variable, 
Trial blocks (20 trials per block) 
 
Figure 4. Mean suboptimal automation usage deci 
sions as a function of the operator variable and trial 
blocks for participants working with the inferior 
machine. 
F(1, 21) = 5.80, p < .05, partial eta squared = 
.22. Self-reliance operators made fewer NCPs 
(M = 68.50) than other-reliant operators (M = 
73.91). Trial blocks was also statistically signifi 
cant, F(1, 21) = 12.53, p <.001, partial eta squared= 
.37. NCPs decreased across trials. The two-way 
interaction attained statistical significance, F(13, 
273) = 2.00, p < .05, partial eta squared = .09. 
Manipulation Checks 
Correct responses on the Operator Response 
screen were more important to self-reliant (M = 
3.41, SD = 1.11) than to other-reliant opera- 
tors (M = 2.27, SD = 1.15), t(43) = 5.18, p < 
.001, suggesting that personal investment and 
human–machine competition were success- 
fully manipulated. Responses to the second 
item, comparing the relative accuracies of the 
human and CID, found that machine reliability 
was successfully varied, t(86) = 20.52, p < .001. 
The superior machine received higher ratings 
(M = 4.27, SD = .82) than the inferior machine 
(M = 1.34, SD = .48). The mean accuracy rat 
ings of self-reliant operators (M = 2.86, SD = 
1.52) and other-reliant operators (M = 2.75, 
SD = 1.73) were not significantly different, 
t(43) = 0.76, ns. Thus, no evidence was found 
indicating that self-reliant operators were more 
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likely to underestimate their errors than other- 
reliant operators. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Personal Investment and John Henry 
Effects 
As predicted, high personal investment in 
unaided performance increased disuse. Self- 
reliant operators committed more suboptimal 
AUDs and NCPs than other-reliant operators 
if the CID was more accurate than the human. 
Although manipulation checks indicate that 
they recognized the CID’s superior accuracy, 
self-reliant operators’ AUDs proved resistant to 
cumulative feedback. Their rate of suboptimal 
decisions never dropped below 54% on any trial 
block (Figure 3). 
Other-reliant operators, having little or no 
personal investment in human control, were 
more responsive to cumulative feedback. They 
exhibited a distinct preference for the CID by 
the second trial block. Their rate of suboptimal 
AUDs across the last 260 trials was 22%. 
Results were also consistent with the suppo 
sition that high personal investment decreases 
misuse. In the inferior machine condition, self- 
reliant operators made fewer suboptimal AUDs 
and had fewer NCP trials than other-reliant oper- 
ators (Figure 4). Even on the first trial block, 
self-reliant operators seldom relied on the CID. 
Feedback indicating that they were more accu 
rate than the machine did not further reduce sub- 
optimal AUDs, perhaps due to a floor effect. 
In contrast, other-reliant operators did not 
exhibit a strong initial preference for human 
control. Forty-one percent of their AUDs were 
suboptimal on the first trial block. Suboptimal 
AUDs gradually decreased as other-reliant 
operators learned that the CID was less accurate 
than the prior participant. When the disuse and 
misuse data are viewed together, they provide 
strong support for the prediction that personal 
investment in unaided performance increases 
the likelihood of John Henry effects. 
As hypothesized, experimental conditions 
that increased suboptimal AUDs resulted in 
lower performance. Effect sizes, however, reveal 
that the operator and trial block variables had a 
greater impact on AUDs than on NCPs. NCPs 
were probably less affected by the experimental 
manipulations because performance is influ 
enced by many variables in addition to personal 
investment and AUDs. 
An alternative interpretation of these findings 
is that self-reliant operators underestimated their 
errors. No doubt, people are often less aware of 
their own errors than they are of mistakes made 
by others or by machines. In this study, how- 
ever, immediate feedback on the Results screen 
was intended to minimize this tendency. This 
procedure appears to have been effective, as 
the manipulation check comparing human with 
CID accuracy found little difference in the ratings 
of self- and other-reliant participants. 
Refusing to rely on automation of proven 
utility is one of many ways people express 
John Henry effects. John Henry effects could 
lead workers to destroy equipment, overem 
phasize machine failures, exaggerate their own 
skills, experience debilitating anxiety, become 
depressed, or organize to prevent mechaniza 
tion. Predicting how John Henry effects will be 
manifested is a complex but important topic for 
future investigations. 
The results of this and other studies empha 
size the need to develop interventions to coun 
ter deleterious John Henry effects. Techniques, 
such as scenario training (Beck et al., 2007), 
which prompt operators to compare the utili 
ties of automated and non-automated con 
trol are one means of decreasing suboptimal 
AUDs. The work of Miller (2002, 2004) on 
human–computer “etiquette” implies that John 
Henry effects will be reduced if operators 
regard automation as a partner rather than a 
competitor. Etiquette may affect trust, which in 
turn influences the probability of intent errors 
(Dzindolet, Beck, & Pierce, in press; Lee & 
Moray, 1992; Lee & See, 2004; Lees & Lee, 
2007; Merritt & Ilgen, 2008; Parasuraman & 
Miller, 2004). 
 
Intent Errors, Misuse, and Disuse 
In this investigation, some appraisal errors 
undoubtedly occurred on the early trials. Still, 
the preponderance of evidence indicates that 
most suboptimal AUDs were errors of intent. 
Manipulation checks found that almost every 
participant recognized whether the human or 
CID  was  more  accurate.  Also, yoking  was 
 
 
employed. With respect to judging the utilities, 
self- and other-reliant operators faced cognitively 
identical tasks. The substantial differences in the 
disuse and misuse rates of self and other-reliant 
operators can be attributed only to intent errors. 
It is very important for researchers to deter 
mine if intent errors affect the AUDs of highly 
trained as well as novice operators. Although 
this issue needs to be tested in an automated 
setting, investigations contrasting actuarial and 
clinical judgments (Dawes, 1994; Dawes, Faust, 
& Meehl, 1989; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & 
Nelson, 2000) often find that professionals are 
not immune to errors of intent. Almost every 
graduate student in the behavioral sciences is 
exposed to the research demonstrating that actu 
arial judgments are frequently more accurate 
than clinical judgments. Nonetheless, person- 
nel directors, therapists, and other professionals 
often rely more on their subjective impres 
sions than on objective data when making life- 
changing assessments. 
If suboptimal AUDs were solely attributable 
to appraisal errors, disuse and misuse could be 
largely eliminated by correcting misjudgments 
of the utilities of the automated and non-
automated alternatives. The potential for 
intent errors necessitates a more complex 
and com- prehensive model of operator 
decision making. AUDs must be viewed as 
governed by multiple objectives, some of 
which may be incompatible with achieving 
task success. 
This experiment demonstrated that opera- 
tors’ personal investment in non-automated 
performance affects the likelihood of John 
Henry effects and intent errors. The challenge 
for investigators is to identify other variables 
that determine the impact of intent errors on 
disuse and misuse. After these conditions 
have been ascertained, interventions must be 
designed to control intent errors as well as 
appraisal errors. 
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